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Abstract
Entry into international markets is a challenging process that fundamentally tests
existing capabilities. During this entry process, capability gaps arise that need to be
bridged to exploit the commercial opportunity and grow the business. Using a global
retailer, Tesco plc, as a case study and employing grounded theory development
techniques, we find that to achieve growth, two organizational attributes become
critical—structural coherence of the firm’s capabilities and organizational identity. We
identify three processes of capability development during market entry—transference,
splicing and enhanced imitation. Further, actions and processes that maintain or adapt
organizational identity serve as moderators of the relationship between these
processes and the capability deployment and internalization necessary for entry into
international markets. We discuss the study’s implications for theories of capability
development, organizational identity and foreign market entry.
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JEL classifications: M30, M10
Date submitted: 1 March 2012 Date accepted: 4 June 2012
1. Introduction
Within the dynamic capabilities literature, how organizational capabilities emerge,
adapt and survive is a topic of great interest (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and
Winter, 2002; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006; Agarwal and Helfat, 2009).
Capabilities are defined as inter-dependent sets of routines that allow a firm to
transform its resource base (Helfat et al., 2007). In particular, scholars have emphasized
how the evolutionary, path-dependent nature of these routines lends structural
coherence to organizational capabilities, so these can become meaningful, stable
frameworks capturing the interdependence of organizational tasks and their appropri-
ate deployment (Winter, 2000). In short, capabilities may be understood as coherent,
purposefully deployed patterns of interconnected organizing processes to reasonably
and reliably achieve organizational outcomes (Autio et al., 2011).
Notably, coherence arises from routines being confined to specific organizational
contexts. In contrast, a change in context shifts the underlying assumptions on the
interdependence of tasks and is likely to destroy structural coherence. Accordingly,
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organizations entering new international markets may find that a mere replication of
home-market routines and capabilities (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Helfat and Peteraf,
2003) has little value when the new market context requires them to adapt their
understanding of how organizational tasks are interrelated and linked to organizational
outcomes (Autio et al., 2011). Although there is some evidence regarding capability
creation during market entry (Hitt et al., 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Cantwell
and Piscitello, 2000; Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Cantwell and Mudambi,
2005; Tallman and Yip, 2008), little is known about how capabilities retain their
structural coherence when transposed to new contexts, how organizational agents take
(purposeful) action to sustain or reduce this coherence, and how this affects the
organization’s ability to deploy and internalize new and adapted capabilities to
successfully internationalize.
Coherence of a firm’s capabilities is likely to be embedded within its organizational
identity. Organizational identity represents how insiders and external constituents
perceive an organization and its activities, by describing what is central, enduring and
distinctive about the organization as perceived by its members on the one hand, and its
external audience on the other (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Tripsas, 2009). In turn,
continuity of identity provides stability within the confines of the organization and also
in terms of its external image (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Accordingly, if the firm’s
way of operating is challenged, so will be the internal (external) perception of ‘who we
(they) are’, ‘what we (they) do’ and ‘why we (they) are successful’ (Tripsas and Gavetti,
2000; Tripsas, 2009). In this context, new market entry signifies a purposeful internal
decision causing a loss in structural coherence of capabilities, and thus challenging a
firm’s identity. Firms then have two options, either to reconfigure routines in the new
market context so that they reflect capabilities that reinforce the organization’s identity
or to combine variants of existing identity with new elements from the external context
that implies reconfiguring capabilities and developing entirely new ones consistent with
the new market (Sapienza et al., 2006; Keil et al., 2008; Bingham, 2009). In this study,
we adopt a grounded theory perspective to examine how a global retail firm expanding
into the US market responds to the loss of structural coherence by reconfiguring its core
capabilities and organizational identity.
This article draws on a detailed and in-depth 3-year longitudinal study of Tesco plc,
the UK’s largest retailer as it entered western US markets. The study is enriched by its
privileged access to Board and Director level executives, historic archival data and
participant’s observation within the firm as it rolled out its US subsidiary, Fresh and
Easy, into California, Arizona and Nevada, commencing in November 2007. To better
understand capability development and organizational identity, we revert to Tesco’s
historic roots. This allows us to track the co-dependence of identity and capability and
the fundamental shifts that occur in these when entering a new international market.
In so doing, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we unpack specific
mechanisms by which structural coherence of capabilities and identity co-evolves when
fundamental shifts in market context occur. Tripsas (2009) explains how capabilities
influence organizational identity in small- and medium-sized technology-driven
enterprises faced with technological change in their environment. In this study, we
further extend this rationale to accommodate large and older firms that are technology-
enabled. These firms have substantial legacy effects that impact organizational identity
and capabilities when entering international markets, thereby purposefully inflicting
change upon themselves. In particular, we explain how structural coherence of
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capabilities and organizational identity are interwoven constructs that have received
less attention in organizational theory and strategy.
Second, we identify detailed processes by which a large organization builds
capabilities in a new market. Specifically, we uncover three key mechanisms by which
new capabilities are formed: transference, splicing and enhanced imitation. By
transference, we refer to the replication of existing capabilities in multiple environments
without local modification, but with opportunities for cognitive learning. Splicing is the
creation of a new capability through unique recombination of extant sets of tasks and
processes drawn largely from multiple locations inside the firm, but also the local
market. Enhanced imitation refers to the creation of unique capabilities via the import
and adaptation of capabilities from other participants in the industry ecosystem.
Together, these three mechanisms drive maintenance and adaptation of organizational
identity in the new market, and represent capabilities essential to successful interna-
tionalization in large firms.
Third, we provide case study evidence to the literature on contemporary practices in
multinational firms, especially to the rapidly expanding multidisciplinary literature on
global retailing (Currah and Wrigley, 2004; Wrigley et al., 2005; Coe and Wrigley, 2009;
Lowe and Wrigley, 2010). The latter examines various ways in which multinational
retail firms adapt to host markets via the import of practices from elsewhere in the
global retail system as well as via the incorporation of locally specific market skills.
However, little emphasis is placed on the co-evolution of identity and capability, or the
strategic importance of historical antecedents to comprehend a firm’s position within
the global marketplace.
2. Market Entry and Structural Coherence
2.1. Capability development in market entry
Entry into international markets, whether as a new venture or an established firm, is a
process fraught with risk and threatens firm survival. Yet, if firms are successful with
entry, it is likely that they will grow faster and survive longer (Sapienza et al., 2006;
Tallman and Yip, 2008). Given that capabilities for market entry influence success and
survival, the processes by which firms manage market entry become important.
Firm entry in new markets challenges fundamental assumptions underlying the
efficacy of capabilities. First, new markets represent new contexts and novel ways of
doing business, which may require the firm to develop entirely new capabilities. Helfat
and Lieberman (2002) note that market entry creates resource and capability gaps that,
in turn, will influence the success of market entry. A strategy that is often cited for
geographic expansion in the retail sector is replication (Winter and Szulanski, 2001)—a
strategy that entails replicating operating procedures, structures, processes and support
infrastructure in new locations. This strategy, in particular, characterizes firms
expanding into markets where contexts do not change drastically, where context
comprises, but goes beyond culture. Importantly, contexts may be different because of
varying competitive intensity, different modes of organizing the supply chain, different
customer expectations or segmentations, regulatory frameworks, etc. As we will show,
multinational retailers expanding into the USA cannot rely on replication alone because
contexts are substantially different, giving rise to capability gaps.
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Second, changes in context represent change in structural coherence of capabilities—
that is, the underlying assumptions of inter-dependence and inter-operability of task
and outcomes they represent is violated, which makes them redundant or less effective,
and may even go on to negate the potential for their evolutionary adaptation (Autio
et al., 2011). Specifically, inter-dependence between organizational actors in routines
assumes that each actor is aware of their respective roles, functions and tasks (Winter,
2003). Modularity in tasks and inter-operability of routines in geographically dispersed
locations assumes that such activities are standardized and can be decomposed into
operant tasks that are easily understood and assimilated by employees (Puranam et al.,
2009). However, cause–effect relationships among organizational tasks and processes,
and between them and organizational outcomes, may vary between different contexts,
fundamentally questioning any standardization assumptions inherent in organizational
capabilities (Autio et al., 2011).
In Tesco, its expansion is both geographic (US entry) as well as organizational
(change in market-entry format, market positioning and supply chain governance) in
scope. Though established firms have a broad resource base, changes in geographic and
organizational scope will require the development of new capabilities (Tallman and Yip,
2008). Although an emerging literature points to conditions for internal development or
external sourcing of capabilities (Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Puranam et al., 2009), the
contingencies and processes by which capability development takes shape in new
market entry remains relatively unexplored (Kotha et al., 2011). Specifically, although it
is clear that organizations may (need to) develop, deploy and internalize new
capabilities when internationalizing (e.g. Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002;
Tallman and Yip, 2008), it is not yet sufficiently clear how they do so. We aim at
filling this gap by studying micro-processes by which firms develop capabilities when
entering new markets.
2.2. Structural coherence and organizational identity
Organizational identity addresses two audiences (Tripsas, 2009). First, it represents
members’ consensual understanding of ‘who we are as an organization’ (Nag et al,
2007, 824), including the markets in which the firm competes, the actions it takes to do
so, and assumptions about why and how these actions lead to success. Thus,
organizational identity provides a cognitive framework guiding individual employees in
making their everyday decisions (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006;
Whetten, 2006; Brickson, 2007; Nag et al., 2007). Second, managers conceive and enact
strategies that further reinforce the organizational identity in the eyes of outsiders, such
as customers, suppliers or investors (Fiol, 1991; Livengood and Reger, 2010). In doing
so, the continuously reinforced organizational identity becomes the basis of stake-
holders’ assessment of the defining characteristics of the organization, which these will
employ to evaluate category conformance and legitimacy of organizational behaviour,
essential for the success of organizational action (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Taken
together, in relatively stable competitive environments, an organization’s identity
provides its members with a guideline and interpretive framework of ‘who we are’,
‘what we do’ and ‘why we do it’ and its audience similarly with information about ‘who
they are, ‘what they do’ and ‘why they do it’.
However, fundamental changes in the context of the firm are likely to disrupt firms’
striving for consistency in their identity because of the conflicting need to adapt to new
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competitive circumstances. Often, these changes are caused exogenously by turbulence
in the firm’s environment. For example, in a field-based case study of the life history of
a digital photography company, Tripsas (2009) found that technological opportunities
challenged the firm’s pre-existing identity and pushed the firm into a phase of identity
ambiguity, which was resolved when the firm converged on a new identity over a
decade. Similarly, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) describe how Polaroid’s strong organ-
izational identity represented an insurmountable inertial force that prevented it from
deploying capabilities it had developed in the newly emerging digital imaging field,
ultimately leading to its demise. Importantly, our empirical setting in multinational
retailing varies considerably in its technological advancement, product focus, changes in
consumer preferences and service orientation, suggesting that environmental turbulence
and its impact on organizational identity should be less of a concern for retail firms
active in a given context. Yet, the decision to enter new retail markets via
internationalization should have effects comparable with environmental turbulence in
other industries: rather than being faced with a constantly evolving context around it,
the firm purposefully decides to move into a novel context in its pursuit of growth.
As firms will generally try to enact strategies to preserve their organizational identity
to achieve competitive advantage (Fiol, 1991), when their identity is challenged by such
a deliberate change in context, the result may have potentially devastating consequences
for the firm’s competitiveness. First, during phases of identity change and ambiguity,
managers’ actions and strategies are likely to alter, and internal (external) actors can be
frustrated by the resulting lack of clarity about ‘who we (they) are’ and ‘what we (they)
do’ (Tripsas, 2009). Second, established knowledge of ‘why we are successful’—how the
deployment of capabilities leads to organizational outcomes, may become redundant,
because of a loss of structural coherence of capabilities. That is to say, they can only
represent meaningful cognitive frameworks for interdependence of the underlying
organizational routines and their outcomes when confined to specific organizational
contexts (Autio et al., 2011). Third, changes in organizational identity can create
discord, especially when new practices are introduced (Oliver, 1991). Finally, audiences
are likely to punish organizations that behave in a manner which conflicts with their
established identity (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In short, changes to organizational
identity and the resulting ambiguity surrounding strategic action imply that managers
are constrained in developing capabilities in rapidly changing or entirely new
environments. However, at the same time, they are required to address the loss of
structural coherence in the firm’s capability base if they want the internationalization
endeavour to become successful.
Accordingly, a firm’s decision to internationalize may be seen as almost axiomatically
infringing the firm’s organizational identity when differences in contexts exist. For
example, international joint ventures or partnerships make issues of social identity
associated with national, organizational and professional affiliations more pertinent
(Alvesson and Wilmott, 2002). Similarly, differences in markets, such as varying
regulatory frameworks or consumer expectations, may require the firm to develop local
variants of its organizational identity (Tallman and Yip, 2008). Here, Pratt and
Foreman (2000, 34) propose that firms may develop an overarching meta-identity as ‘a
superordinate self-categorization with which discrete organizational identities can
relate’ to ensure synergies from and reduce conflict between local variants. For
example, Tesco’s meta-identity is that of a ‘food retailer’, which links its strong and
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distinct UK home market identity (see Livengood and Reger, 2010) to those in other
markets.
Summarizing our argument thus far, new market entry may create two distinct, yet
inter-related problems for the organization. First, a change in context destroys
structural coherence in capabilities as underlying assumptions of inter-dependence and
inter-operability of routines become less clear. Second, entry into new markets serves to
disrupt organizational identity, especially if such entry is perceived as critical by the
organization’s stakeholders. During phases of identity ambiguity, structural coherence
is further eroded as managers are less certain of the organizational direction and
strategies to reinforce their identity are misaligned. To understand how internationaliz-
ing firms overcome these critical issues, by potentially increasing structural coherence
through managing their organizational identity, and how they develop new capabilities,
we examine Tesco’s entry into the US market.
3. Data and Method
We conducted a detailed study of retail innovation more broadly, with a fine-grained
analysis of Tesco’s market entry into US markets. Taking a grounded theory
perspective (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), our study is inductive, field-based and allows
us to ‘delve deeply into the organization and thus develop a rich understanding of the
evolution of identity’ (Tripsas, 2009, 444). Following an approach similar to Eisenhardt
(1989, 532), a roadmap reveals the dynamics present within single settings.
In that context, Tables 1 and 2 summarize Tesco’s eight decade history and the
evolution of its core capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates its expanding domestic and then
increasingly global footprint. Significantly, we note that Tesco’s evolution both as a
domestic market operator and, more recently, as a major multinational has been far
from linear. The firm has experienced important phases of retrenchment—both in its
home market growth and, notably, in its early forays during the 1980s/early 1990s into
markets outside the UK.
For example, Tesco’s initial expansion into the Irish Republic shown in the Figure 1
(1983 map) was short-lived, whilst a similar acquisition-based expansion into northern
France in the early 1990s ended in market exit just 3 years later. Additionally, during
the 1990s, the firm experienced a major restructuring of its organizational identity.
Essentially, that involved broadening its appeal beyond (although not relinquishing) its
‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ discounter roots and repositioning itself a mass-market
multi-format supermarket operator serving all socio-economic groups, all regions, all
geographic areas—with a segmented ‘retailer brand’ range (‘Value’ to ‘Finest’) to meet
the differentiated demands of its customers. The reconstitution of its organizational
identity took place simultaneously with its initial wresting of UK market leadership
during the mid-1990s from the long-standing previous leader Sainsbury plc. Arguably,
it was then critical to the accelerating strengthening of Tesco’s UK market leadership
over the following decade to a point in the mid-2000s where it had twice the market
share of its closest rivals.
Moreover, it was an identity reconstitution that was continuously refined as Tesco
first cautiously restarted its international expansion with a move into the emerging
consumer markets of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s
(Figure 1, 1998 map), and then, more aggressively, into East Asia following the Asian
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economic crisis of 1997/1998. Over the next decade, as Tesco became increasingly adept
as an international operator, its successive entries into 12 markets outside the UK and
the shift in the balance of its global operating space—to a point in 2009 where 65% of
that space was outside its home market—had significant and continuous effects on its
organizational identity.
Figure 1. Tesco’s expanding operations (1932–2008).
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Learning to manage increasingly large and dispersed store and sourcing networks
across countries with very different institutional, cultural and regulatory environments
continuously and comprehensively modified Tesco’s competencies and deeply affected
its organizational structures. As the firm’s belief in its abilities as a multinational
operator grew, and as it rapidly expanded to become one of the world’s top five
retailers, its organizational identity was increasingly perceived as a potential source of
competitive advantage.
The high-risk nature of Tesco’s entry into the USA is of interest analytically because
of its potential to disrupt the coherence of the organizational identity which Tesco had
so carefully and successfully nurtured over that decade. It was high-risk for several
reasons. First, because many international retailers, including Tesco’s UK rival
Sainsbury, had tried to build a presence in the USA, but many had failed and been
forced to exit (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010). Crucially, despite apparent similarities
between the US and UK cultures, subtle but fundamental differences in consumer
culture and market structures had made the US market extremely resistant to
international expansion, in particular by UK retailers (Coe and Wrigley, 2009). Second,
unlike any of its previous entries into emerging markets, the high visibility of a US entry
exposed the firm to more hostile financial-market scrutiny than it had received at any
point during its previous decade of international expansion, creating considerable strain
for Tesco’s organizational identity. Market failure in the USA and forced exit was not
an easy option for the firm to consider as it was likely to trigger criticism of
underperforming elements elsewhere in Tesco’s international operations, and discredit
those individuals associated with it (including the CEO), potentially causing an exodus
of managerial talent that Tesco had nurtured over years of largely successful
internationalization. Third, the USA was the ‘home turf’ of the world’s largest retailer,
Wal-Mart, suggesting a fierce competitive reaction to Tesco’s entry was almost
inevitable (see Livengood and Reger, 2010).
3.1. Method
The study is built on a participative form of research in which we engaged with the firm
and obtained the perspectives of the firm’s managers as key stakeholders. In this way, it
has some of the characteristics of what is described as ‘engaged scholarship’ (Van de
Ven, 2007). Obtaining these perspectives involved in-depth semi-structured interviews in
both the USA and the UK with 16 key participants in the firm’s market entry strategy,
conducted in the manner which Clark (1998) refers to as ‘close dialogue’, relying upon
the intimacy or closeness of researchers to industry respondents, and exhibiting a level
of personal commitment quite at odds with conventional notions of scientific
disassociation and objectivity (Clark, 1998, 73). The material gathered in these
interviews was then triangulated with multiple insights and documentation obtained
from investment bank analysts, company archives, national and local media sources,
the ‘voice’ of the local community expressed via websites, blogs, retail industry
consultants with immediate knowledge of Tesco’s US venture, leading US-based
academics acknowledged as experts on the industry, and dialogue with managers of
other leading food retailers.
Unlike Clark (2007, 192) who prefers only ‘rarely to identify respondents or to quote
their opinions’, we prefer where possible to give anonymized ‘voice’ to our interviewees,
and to utilize what Mintzberg (1979) refers to as ‘the richness that comes from
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anecdote’ to construct our grounded theory. However, although our corporate
interviewees were aware that their firm had permitted us an unusual level of access
given the high risk nature of the market entry Tesco was engaged, a few managers
exercised their right to remain unquoted. Our article conscientiously respects that right
and blends material from interviewees who gave their consent with publicly available
statements of senior executives.
3.2. Research setting, interviews and observation
Our research involved an in-depth, 3-year longitudinal case study (November 2007 to
August 2010) of Tesco as it entered western US markets. Beginning with simultaneous
store openings in Los Angeles and Las Vegas as Fresh and Easy Neighbourhood
Markets, Tesco rolled out a chain of 100 stores (approximately half in southern
California and half in Phoenix and Las Vegas) within its first year of operation and by
August 2010 had 159 stores in operation (increasing to 175 by April 2011). The
subsidiary is headquartered in El Segundo, Los Angeles (close to Manhattan Beach),
and operates a distribution and food preparation centre with capacity to supply 500
stores on a former US Air Force base at Riverside County east of Los Angeles.
Quantitative and qualitative data covering the entire lifespan of Fresh and Easy were
gathered from multiple sources, with three sources being of particular significance.
First, semi-structured interviews were carried out in four main waves from the autumn
of 2007 onwards, in both the USA and the UK. These interviews focused on a key
group of 16 Tesco managers at different levels of seniority within the firm and from
different functional areas (marketing, property acquisition and development, corporate
affairs, site location and market analysis, etc.) who had not only been central within the
development of the US market entry strategy and its initial execution, and to
discussions regarding the market positioning of the US subsidiary, but who had also
been closely involved in other major international market entries in Asia and Central
and Eastern Europe. As a result, these managers were able to discuss the US experiment
in the light of sequential development of the firm’s international reach over a 15-year
period since the mid-1990s.
Indeed, a significant feature of Tesco’s organizational identity would seem to relate to
its retention of key executives for substantial parts of their careers, such that several of
the managers interviewed had periods of employment with the company spanning over
25–30 years and across a wide range of the firm’s operational divisions. Some of these
managers were interviewed on multiple occasions as the subsidiary expanded its store
network and modified some of its operational systems over the first 3 years of
operation. Each interview lasted at least 2 h and these ‘formal’ discussions were later
followed up via email for clarification of the key points. Interviews that were taped were
transcribed and in cases where this was not permitted by the interviewee, detailed notes
were taken and these expanded immediately after the meeting. The Tesco manager
interviews were supplemented, where appropriate, with similarly intensive
semi-structured interviews with retail industry analysts, key local-community stake-
holders (e.g. the Los Angeles City Councillor for the deprived poor-food-access 9th
District), leading US and UK academic authorities on the US food retail industry and
rival US food retailers.
Second, four periods of intensive participant observation with the firm were
undertaken in 2008, 2009 and 2010 including visits to the firm’s headquarters in both
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the USA and the UK, tours of Fresh and Easy stores and involvement in day-to-day
operations with firm executives, intensive in-depth participant observation in a variety
of store settings in Los Angeles, Phoenix and San Diego as well as participation in store
openings and visits to local suppliers who became crucial elements within Tesco’s US
sourcing networks. Further information was collected via the simultaneous study of
major US food retailers and, in particular, via comparison of the Fresh and Easy
format with an experimental Wal-Mart small-store format, launched in Phoenix, in
what appeared to be direct head-to-head competition with Tesco, in the autumn of
2008.
Third, archival sources including publicly available documents and press reports were
examined, as well as analyst and retail industry commentary made available to the
researchers. Detailed field notes (including photographs and other documentary
evidence) were taken in all research settings and were supplemented with informal
discussions with both employees and customers.
The material outlined above was further triangulated with insights obtained from
Tesco ‘insiders’ with whom we had developed a relationship of trust via a series of
previous largely UK-based research projects (e.g. Lowe and Wrigley, 2010). Like
Tripsas (2009), we found this combination of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status provided a
unique perspective, and the constructive linking of these two modes of enquiry was
particularly fruitful as our research progressed.
Notably, our data gathering efforts not only allowed us to draw a rich picture of
Tesco’s US entry, but they also encompass crucial information about Tesco’s previous
international expansions. Although in this article, we focus our efforts on the US data,
we also draw on Tesco’s previous experiences in other markets where appropriate. In
that way, we inject a comparative dimension into an otherwise single-case-study design
and facilitate considerable conceptual leverage (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally,
where appropriate, we inject into the analysis two further comparative dimensions
based on the available academic literature concerning the management of multinational
retail firms: (i) the experiences of other European food retail multinationals that have
attempted, with varying degrees of success, entry into the US market; and (ii) studies of
retail multinationals entering emerging markets rather than mature highly competitive
markets such as the USA.
3.3. Data analysis
Analysis of these multiple data sources followed a ‘grounded theory’ approach whereby
the transcriptions and field notes were examined for emergent themes. The underlying
principle was to work ‘backwards and forwards between theory and the empirical world
in a reflexive manner’ (Clark, 2007, 191), or as Keil et al. (2008, 1480) express it, ‘to
rotate among data, literature and emerging theory moving from description to
explanation’. Using established protocols to scrutinize the robustness of the developing
theories, we discussed and iterated themes and then tabulated and triangulated these
themes with a timeline capturing the history of the firm. There were at least four
iterations until we could provide a stable and valid account using the theoretical
concepts described earlier. These concepts were then ‘tested’ via further discussions and
reading of the developing framework with a key contributor to the retail globalization
literature as well as via discussions of emerging themes with a small number of key
research participants. Further, during the process of writing this article, two teaching
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cases were written—one on the globalization of Tesco and one on aspects on innovation
at Fresh and Easy, and these cases were both shared with research participants to check
for accuracy and inappropriate representations. Our findings provided a systematic
method to develop propositions on the relationship between capability development,
organizational identity and firm growth. The summary of our findings are graphically
presented in Figure 2.
4. Findings and Theory Development
4.1. Transference and capability development
To be able to deploy capabilities in a newly entered market, firms are required to
re-build their capabilities. For geographic expansion, the standard approach of such
re-building is replication of existing capabilities, potentially aided by behavioural
adaptation (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Winter and Szulanski (2001) found that many
retailers rely on replication to grow their footprint in new markets. Though their study
was confined to domestic expansion, the underlying elements of codification and
replication of routines formed a cornerstone of market growth. Similarly, our
investigation revealed that Tesco engaged in processes to replicate existing, intercon-
nected sets of organizing processes in a new environment. We label this as ‘transference’
of capabilities. Specifically, transference is the deployment of inter-dependent tasks and
capabilities in multiple environments without local modification. However, different to
‘simple’ replication, we show how transference may actually increase the organization’s
aptitude at deploying its capabilities beyond arguments of behavioural learning and
adaptation. In short, because internationalization increases firms’ understanding of
how the organizing processes making up its capabilities work together (Autio et al.,
2011), they can also improve their cognitive aptitude at deploying and exercising these
processes.
Capability  
Deployment and 
Internalization 
International 
Growth 
Transference 
Splicing 
Enhanced 
Imitation 
Identity
Buffering and
Morphing
Figure 2. Capability development, identity and international growth.
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We found that Tesco engaged in transference in two distinct yet related ways. The
first form of transference was the firm’s ‘core’ capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990)
developed over a decade of intense home and international expansion in the form of a
codified set of organizing processes, their interactions and associated outcomes. The
second form of transference was through ‘partner’ or ‘co-dependent’ capabilities (Kale
and Singh, 2007), which the firm had developed through deep relationships with
strategic growth partners in the logistics and food processing sectors in Tesco’s UK
home market.
In the context of the first of these two types of capability transference, Tesco had
established a process of top–down transfer of competencies involving the transmission
of codified knowledge relating to back office and retail processes, systems and operating
capabilities. Previously referred to as ‘Tesco in a Box’ and now referred to as the Tesco
Operating Model, it consisted of a collection of Tesco’s essential organizing processes
which had been developed, collected and honed over several decades of both home
market competition and during rapid international expansion since the mid-1990s.
Initially implemented in 2004,
‘Tesco in a Box’ was essentially a resource to support Tesco’s rapidly growing international
business, initially, comprising a standard set of IT systems covering the firm’s ‘standard
approach to implementing supply chain management, warehouse management, product price
management, point of sale, financials, all the core building blocks’
—(Tesco Director of Group Technology Architecture, quoted in Shifrin, 2008)
This diffusion was supported by ‘knowledge activists’—highly mobile managers
working out of Tesco’s International Support Office, whose role was to span
boundaries within the firm and to supplement the replication of the organizing
processes codified in the ‘Operating Model’ with hands-on transmission of tacit
knowledge, whist also promoting bottom–up capture and transfer of knowledge from
within the international subsidiaries (Currah and Wrigley, 2004). Importantly, with
each international expansion, these agents learnt about additional contingencies present
in a local market that would influence whether or not Tesco’s core organizing processes
could be successfully replicated and built new knowledge about how to deploy them
across a wide range of institutional, cultural and regulatory contexts. In turn, this
allowed Tesco to apply its core capabilities to the new markets. Additionally, the
process ensured that Tesco improved both its dynamic abilities in respect of deploying
those capabilities, and its cognitive aptitude in exercising them, by learning about which
mechanisms influenced success and failure in new environments. Significantly, the US
market entry provided an important first opportunity to utilize the full capabilities of
the Operating Model, without its effect being confounded by local path dependencies,
prior to its planned migration across the whole firm during 2010/2011. As Corporate
Interviewee B noted, the USA provided
‘the first place where we pulled the Operating Model together. . . [the US business] was all so
new so it didn’t have a legacy so it had no legacy systems’
In the context of the second type of capability transference – ‘partner’ or ‘co-
dependent’ capabilities—Tesco again attempted to replicate some of the organizing
processes it used in both its home market and its international subsidiaries in terms of
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working together with key ‘preferred suppliers’. Specifically, to link its 675,000 sq ft
distribution/food preparation centre built to serve the initial phases of rolling-out its US
store network, Tesco relied heavily on transferring established relationships with both
logistics operators and food products suppliers. In the case of distribution systems,
Tesco signed a $25 million 5-year contract with Polymer Logistics—a logistics supply
chain specialist which it used in the UK—to operationalize the short lead time, efficient
and dependable distribution system which was critical to the Fresh and Easy offer.
Essentially that system involved delivery to stores of pre-loaded, shelf-ready product
trays, designed to be reusable and tagged with computer chips so that supply chain cycle
times can be tracked, analyzed and optimized.
In relation to supplying the separate 80,000 sq ft food preparation facility that Tesco
constructed at its Riverside Distribution Center (DC), that involved ‘follower–supplier’
simultaneous moves to California of two of its leading UK suppliers—‘Natures Way
Foods’ and ‘2 Sisters Food Group’. Nature’s Way set up US company Wild Rocket
Foods and invested $100 million in a processing plant adjacent to the DC, whilst 2
Sisters invested $70 million in a similarly located facility. In turn, Nature’s Way worked
with Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, an organic producer importing from Mexico, and
Betteravia Farms, a California/Arizona grower, to supply prepared salads, vegetables
fruit and juices, whilst 2 Sisters worked with APPA Fine Foods to supply poultry, meat
and seafood. Together, the US operations established by these ‘follower–suppliers’ fed
into the DC both shelf-ready packaged produce as well as 40% of the chopped and
prepared meat, poultry, fruit and vegetable ingredients used in the food preparation
facility.
Although the systemic transfer processes themselves involved replication in the USA
of pre-arranged sets of organizing processes used by Tesco in both the UK and some of
its international subsidiaries, the US context also provided substantial learning
opportunities for Tesco. The ‘follower–supplier’ relationships are of considerable
conceptual interest, and the transference of co-dependent capabilities is largely
undocumented in global retail. In addition, as the unexpectedly deep recession in the
western US states, which followed the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, slowed the
planned pace of expansion of Fresh and Easy’s store network, eventually it forced
Tesco to buy out the investment of its ‘follower’ UK suppliers, highlighting potential
limits in the practice of co-dependent capability transfer.
Taken together, we see that Tesco, through transference, replicated existing
capabilities in a new geographic market, and, in doing that, improved its behavioural
and cognitive ability at exercising these in the new market and, potentially, in its
wider international operations. Specifically, we observe that through its experience in
its home market and previous international expansions, Tesco developed a set of core
and co-dependent capabilities, and that, based on the context, Tesco could select
from pre-defined sets of interconnected organizing processes and deploy them as
needed. In turn, transference of capabilities to new markets allowed Tesco to
internalize how its organizing processes work together as capabilities, and the
conditions under which they could be deployed successfully. As a result, transference
enhanced Tesco’s general aptitude at exercising these capabilities in new markets.
Finally, we see that the process of transference itself is a dynamic capability (see
Zollo and Winter, 2002), in that it provides the basis for the organization to
reconfigure its existing capabilities.
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4.2. Transference, capability development and organizational identity
Entry into foreign markets represents a non-trivial challenge for an organization, as it
becomes exposed to localization and customization needs to meet demands of the
consumer. This is particularly the case in retail globalization where achieving what has
been termed as ‘territorial embeddedness’ has increasingly been seen as vital to
competitive success in international markets (Wrigley et al., 2005). Such customization
may require a firm to modify its organizational identity and that modification can
manifest itself at various levels. It can involve altering the set of activities or addressing
conflicting pressures that originate from differing cultures. Organizational identity
modification, in turn, impacts both the manner in which the firm operates and the
mechanisms put into place to do so. Taken further, it may require a fundamental
reassessment of the firm’s capabilities, values and priorities.
The interaction of capability development through transference on the one hand and
organizational identity on the other is, we argue, facilitated by, and dependent on, the
Tesco Operating Model. Specifically, we suggest that the Operating Model serves two
purposes: one the one hand, it allows the firm to buffer (Jain et al., 2009) the most salient
elements of its organizational identity, on the other, it allows it to morph (e.g. Rindova
andKotha, 2001) its organizational identity based on the immediate situation or context.
In terms of buffering its organizational identity (where buffering is defined as
preserving certain crucial elements of organizational identity), Tesco’s transference of
its core and co-dependent capabilities allows for standardization and the development
of a common, shared understanding among employees of how the firm performs a task
and how these tasks are inter-related, complementary and reinforce each other. Here,
the structural coherence of interdependent organizing processes is captured by the
codified knowledge within the Operating Model, which facilitates a shared under-
standing of ‘what is done’ and ‘how things are done’, helps create and maintain a shared
identity among employees of Tesco’s values and capabilities, and embodies how the
firm treats customers and employees. That is to say, the Operating Model helps develop
and maintain a shared, common identity of the organization and its operations, and
assure that synergies and learning opportunities exist every time that Tesco deploys it. It
does so not simply by replicating capabilities, but by providing greater shared meaning
in how and what gets done. This shared meaning, derived through the coherence of
what the firm possesses and what it does, enhances employees’ capacity to work on
complex cross-border functions. Thus, by keeping intact the most salient elements of
Tesco’s organizational identity (i.e. buffering) and transposing them to a new context,
Tesco can further enhance employee and stakeholder awareness of the firm’s activities,
thereby increasing the potential impact of transference.
Regarding the morphing of organizational identity, the Operating Model allows for
selection, that is, transference of only those capabilities that are needed during a specific
international entry, based on the market niche identified.
‘As we grow, if a country needs the capability they put their hand into the box and say ‘I’ll have
one of those, rather than going out and searching [for example] for an enterprise resource
planning system . . .Over the last 2 years that’s translated into not only a set of IT systems but
also a set of business processes. So it’s absolutely an end-to-end set of systems. . .It describes
planning and building stores, deciding on markets, selecting products, getting through the
supply chain to selling to the customers in the shops’
—(Tesco Director of Group Technology and Architecture, quoted in Shifrin, 2008)
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Thus, at the same time that transference allows for the buffering of Tesco’s
organizational identity, the transference of only selected capabilities may (purposefully)
imply the creation of a local capability profile that is significantly different from that of
other markets. Specifically, in the case of its US entry, we observe that Tesco needed to
deploy a set of capabilities that would allow it to fill a market niche very different from
its general mass market positioning—thus potentially causing an ‘identity gap’
(Foreman and Whetten, 2002). In simple terms, the organizational identity Tesco
targeted for its US subsidiary was likely to be at odds with the organizational identity of
the firm in both its home market and in several of its international markets, creating
conflict in the eyes of employees, customers and investors. For example, elements of
Tesco’s organizational identity, in particular the ‘global multinational’ and the ‘market
dominant’ components of that identity, would have become a liability in Tesco’s US
market positioning because they were unlikely to be fungible (Danneels, 2011) beyond
those markets in which it had, or had the potential to, become market leader. Thus, it
was unlikely that Tesco could have successfully deployed its capabilities in the USA
through transference and also transposed its home market identity at the same time. In
that context, Tesco decided instead to radically morph its organizational identity in the
USA, signified by the creation a new and distinct brand (Fresh and Easy
Neighbourhood Markets), which featured neither the Tesco name nor its traditional
corporate colours (shades of green vs. red and blue), with little overt reference being
made to Fresh and Easy’s UK parent.
‘It’s the purest example I think of anything Tesco has ever done that’s brand led. It’s a very
clearly defined brand with very strong you know ‘this is what the brand stands for’, and that is
wired through the organisation and then marketed absolutely against that platform’
—[Corporate Interviewee B]
Similarly, to facilitate entry into Asia, Tesco had earlier morphed its organizational
identity by combining it with that of local champions. For example, for its entry in
South Korea and Thailand, Tesco had acquired majority stakes in the fledgling retail
chains (Homeplus and Lotus) of two leading domestic conglomerates (Samsung and CP
Group). Those chains together had less than 20 outlets and development sites.
However, even when continuous and substantial investment by Tesco had grown
these chains to more than 800 stores in multiple formats, and diluted the ownership
shares of the domestic conglomerates to 0% in Thailand and 2% in South Korea,
Tesco still retained the original brand names as part of a locally morphed organiza-
tional identity (‘Tesco Lotus’ and ‘Samsung-Tesco’) with the Samsung name being
particularly important in South Korea (Coe and Lee, 2006). In turn, these morphed
identities positively supported the transference of the sets of organizing processes
selected.
Taken together, we see that the interplay of capability development (via transference)
and organizational identity occurs through two distinct mechanisms—buffering and
morphing—both of which are facilitated by the Tesco Operating Model. Further, we
argue that the Operating Model embodies and sustains Tesco’s overarching
meta-identity as multinational food retailer. In turn, through buffering and morphing,
Tesco can create local identities for the international markets in which it is active—that
is, appropriate local internal (external) definitions of ‘who we (they) are’, ‘what we
(they) do’ and ‘why we (they) are successful’. Simultaneously, buffering allows Tesco to
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keep the most salient aspects of its identity constant across markets, thereby ensuring
that synergies between identities exist (Pratt and Foreman, 2000, 34). Finally, both
buffering and morphing positively affect the potential that capability development
through transference has with respect to capability deployment and internalization, and
also international growth. In that regard, we argue that buffering improves cognitive
understanding and that morphing improves contextual compatibility.
4.3. Splicing and capability development
Entering new markets also requires changes to existing capabilities. Different
approaches are seen in the literature where firms develop capabilities from scratch
(e.g. Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), transfer them collectively (e.g. Zhao and Anand,
2009) or adapt existing capabilities to new conditions (Autio et al., 2011). In our case
study, we found that Tesco adopted a strategy of capability ‘splicing’. Splicing entails
the creation of new capabilities through unique recombination of elements of extant
capabilities from multiple locations. Akin to the genetic engineering concept of adding
or deleting base pairs in a gene where the spliced gene has a newly developed
functionality, Tesco took and recombined organizing processes from its domestic and
international market capabilities, possibly further enriching these with organizing
processes adapted from best-practice capabilities from local firms. This model of
splicing differs from capability honing through evolving routines; instead, the routines
drawn from the firm’s set of organizing processes remain intact and are combined with
others from the international operations of the firm or local competitors to form new
capabilities.
For example, to support both its food preparation facility at Riverside and supply
products directly into its Distribution Centre, Tesco actively engaged in building a
network of preferred supplier relationships with small- and medium-sized US suppliers.
Many examples of innovative specialist small suppliers who became part of Tesco’s
network and subsequently scaled-up their operations have been documented—ranging
from a small, local, family-based manufacturer of tortillas without additives or
preservatives in Los Angeles, to an artisan coffee supplier from San Diego deeply
committed to ethical sourcing. A particularly illuminating example is provided by
Phoenix-based ice cream manufacturer ‘Berto’s’, which became the sole supplier of ice
cream and sorbet to Fresh and Easy. Describing the process of becoming a preferred
supplier, Berto’s CEO paints a picture of adjusting to Tesco’s home-market developed
quality control capabilities—a regime significantly more exacting than the US supplier
had previously operated within:
‘We had really high quality standards, but when Fresh and Easy came into our life they took us
to a whole new level of expectations. . .they had auditors and food scientists here making sure
that what we were going to send them was what we said it was. . .I supplied information about
our products to their technical library [and] I even spent time working at their secret
[prototype] store in California’
—(CEO Berto’s quoted in Creno, 2008)
Tesco spliced the core competencies it had derived from its extensive home and
international market experience of the governance of preferred supplier systems with
critical local-market supplier capabilities vital to its ability to compete successfully in
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markets with distinctive local cultures of consumption. Specifically, Tesco’s
preferred-suppliers systems provided them with a critical ‘mechanism for vertical
co-ordination’ (Humphrey, 2007), helping to reduce the uncertainty and risks
associated with a small- and medium-sized supplier oriented supply chain, in a context
where the ability to ensure quality control and visibility along the chain was
strategically central to Tesco in terms of being able to deliver the core value proposition
of its Fresh and Easy brand. That is to say, capability splicing and the necessary
recombination of organizing processes was vital to Tesco’s ability to deliver the type of
supply chain central to the realization of Tesco’s vision of a US subsidiary served by
supply networks with exceptional levels of quality control and visibility and with the
capacity to rapidly and consistently deliver innovatory products—notably chilled
prepared ready meals—which the US food manufacturing industry had traditionally
been poor at supplying. In turn, it is evident that splicing is a dynamic capability, in that
it allowed Tesco to renew its own core capabilities by recombining them with
capabilities of other local firms.
4.4. Splicing, capability development and organizational identity
Although recombining capabilities via splicing was a vital mode of growth for Tesco, it
is also important to evaluate how these capabilities altered Tesco’s identity as a retailer.
Though some research exists on how deliberate capability transformations can
concomitantly alter a firm’s strategy and structure (e.g. Agarwal and Helfat, 2009;
Autio et al., 2011), very little work has examined how such changes might alter the
firm’s organizational identity. Here, we suggest that the splicing involved in its US
operations may have provided Tesco with new growth capabilities scalable not only
across any future larger US chain but also across Tesco’s wider international
operations. Two examples illustrate this phenomenon.
First, Tesco needed to ensure that it could deliver some of the key propositions of its
Fresh and Easy subsidiary—i.e., neighbourhood stores focused on a tightly edited offer
of high-quality but affordable, short-shelf-life, fresh and chilled prepared-meal products
served by a short lead-time dedicated integrated food production and distribution
system—and also to transfer and adapt some of its core home-market competencies
(notably its extensive experience with chilled ready-meal development and associated
cool-chain distribution logistics-system operation) to the western US markets. To do so,
Tesco was obliged to take the necessary step of managing its own food preparation. In
none of the other international markets in which it operated did Tesco assume this role.
Yet, in the USA, it took the decision to initially produce around 120 product lines—
ranging from sandwiches and sushi to chilled prepared meals—in an 80,000 sq ft food
preparation facility it constructed at its Riverside DC. As the Financial Times (2007) put
it at the time of the US launch ‘Tesco has become a food manufacturer as part of its
efforts to win over US shoppers’; and that view has become progressively more
accurate, particularly following Tesco’s aforementioned 2010 buyout of the investment
of the two major UK suppliers that had followed the firm into the USA.
The reasons why Tesco did not wish to rely on local third-party providers of prepared
food related primarily to its concerns about prevailing US quality and traceability
standards among such providers. Additionally, self-production allowed Tesco to
respond rapidly and efficiently to shifting consumer tastes and levels of demand within
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the store network—incorporating previous day’s sales levels into next-day delivery
quantities.
Nevertheless, a consequence of this move has been an important shift in the firm’s
organizational identity for its US operations. Here, it has positioned itself—and in turn is
perceived by consumers—less as a ruthlessly competitive retail multinational and
dominant market leader, but more as a ‘life-style’ supermarket—that is to say more
Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s thanWal-Mart. Moreover, this life-style positioning, and
the foodmanufacturing and food preparation capabilities which operationalize the Fresh
and Easy proposition, are clearly seen by Tesco as potentially transferable to other parts
of its future portfolio of international operations. Indeed, Tesco is well aware that some of
its fiercest rivals gain competitive advantages from being their own producers,
particularly in an era where the provenance of the food has become a progressively
greater concern to consumers. For example, in its UK home market, Morrisons and
Waitrose have potentially significant competitive advantages to be exploited from their
food production operations. Waitrose, in particular, shows the positive contributions
which can accrue to a retailer’s organizational identity in this way.
A second example relates to an important element within what has been described
as Fresh and Easy’s ‘simple and efficient business model [which] allows it to offer
Wal-Mart prices in convenience store locations’ (Daily Telegraph, 2007). Namely,
the 100% self-checkout lanes in the Fresh and Easy stores which allow them to
operate with reduced staffing levels and costs relative to many of their US rivals. In
this context, although Tesco had experimented extensively with self-scanning else-
where in its international operations, the decision to make the Fresh and Easy
stores 100% self-checkout drew together these experiments into a single novel, but
untested system—that is to say, a recombination of existing capabilities from across the
firm’s global portfolio with local-knowledge-induced capabilities. Indeed, some US
commentators have explicitly compared Fresh and Easy’s checkout system to Clarence
Saunders first ‘self-service store’ Piggly Wiggly which opened in 1916 and
‘revolutionized retail’ (Kiviat, 2008)—increasing efficiency and allowing substantial
labour cost savings.
In practice, Fresh and Easy’s checkout system is termed ‘assisted service’. That is to
say, it attempts to be sensitive to the demands of a consumer culture in the USA
renowned for its customer service levels, Fresh and Easy’s Marketing Director clarifies
what is meant by assisted service:
‘If you want to checkout yourself you can, if you want help we’ll provide it, and if you want us
to do it for you we will. In doing this we’ve managed to create a whole new level of customer
and staff interaction. The checkout operator is no longer part of the machine. Rather our
customer assistants are there to help, with the added benefit that our checkouts are open all the
time. . .Our customers are overwhelmingly positive. We’ve managed to combine technology
and people to enhance the experience
—(Fresh and Easy Blog, 2008)
Initially the model tested was a
‘combination of normal manned checkouts and self service. . .then our light bulb moment came
when we went—hang on a second, why don’t we just put in checkouts that can be either
manned or self service so you are not limited’
—(Corporate Interviewee B)
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As a result, assisted service is fundamentally reliant on the quality and attitude of the
retailer’s staff. In this context, ‘Living Service’ programme experiments in Tesco’s
Customer Service Centre in Dundee, Scotland, had indicated the scope and scale of
potential productivity gains which could be realized via enhanced employee engagement
and had subsequently been rolled out across the firm’s UK store network and also into
its non-store retail services. Whilst tools from that programme were clearly transferred
to support the US-assisted self-checkout operation, it is important to note that in
practice the transfer involved a significant recombination of those capabilities with the
logic and practices of self/assisted checkout in local US market consumer cultures where
staff service levels had traditionally been high.
[Although] we brought all that over – back to the transfer of learning again. . .we went: ‘How
are we going to create a culture in this business? Well we’ve got some of the tools because we
know all about this [from the Living Service initiative] and so we could bring a lot of that over
and then the Americans locally could adapt it. . . and it all worked wonderfully well’
—(Corporate Interviewee B)
As in the case of Tesco’s move into food processing and preparation,
self-checkout and labour utilization capabilities provided Tesco not only with
potentially transferable and scalable new competencies but, alongside the creation of
the distinctive Fresh and Easy neighbourhood-focused brand, also helped to
facilitate the repositioning of the firm’s identity as a retailer in the USA. That is
to say, it eased Tesco’s efforts at changing ‘who we (they) are’ and ‘what we (they)
do’ in the USA and helped to facilitate the identity morphing necessary to benefit
from capability splicing. Consequently, we suggest a link between identity morphing
and capability development through splicing which, in turn, improves an organiza-
tion’s chances at capability deployment, internalization and, in turn, international
growth.
4.5. Enhanced imitation and capability development
Imitation as a strategy for growth is quite common, often termed a ‘bandwagon effect’
in organizational studies that examine practices such as total quality management or
ISO 9000 certification (Terlaak and Gong, 2008). Organizations adopt capabilities of
competitor firms and act to conform to a generalized identity, often referred to as
institutional isomorphism, to enable stakeholders such as investors to be better able to
evaluate and understand firm strategy. Although such capability imitation provides
benefits of speed in strategic responsiveness to competitor threats, it might not always
fit easily with a firm’s platform of existing capabilities (Helfat, 1997; Maritan, 2000;
Semadeni and Anderson, 2010). In its US market entry, Tesco used several variants of
imitation, copying and purposefully modifying elements of competitor capabilities, to
facilitate its entry into the US market. Thus, enhanced imitation provides for the
creation of unique capability via the import of key strategic influences from other
members of the global retail system.
For instance, Tesco had noted that US drug-store retailers, particularly Walgreens
and CVS, had built their rapid growth since the late 1980s around the development of
dense networks of 10,000 sq ft high-visibility corner-location stores. Indeed, Walgreens
had been opening such stores at a rate of more than one per day for long periods in the
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1990s. Tesco and its CEO in particular, recognized that this model could be emulated to
form an important element in the structuring of a new breed of smaller-format food
stores developed on a mutually reinforcing network logic.
‘[Tesco’s CEO Sir Terry Leahy] had seen Walgreens at a mile and a half apart. But Walgreens
were able to operate at that level because their sales didn’t need to be that high, and also they
had taken 30 years to get that network together. We were expected to get the network in 3
years’
—(Corporate Interviewee A)
To realize Leahy’s vision, Tesco specialists in market analysis as well as site
research and property development could not simply transfer in and embed the firm’s
widely acknowledged competencies in areas such as wholesale into the structure of the
subsidiary. Instead, competencies relating to optimization of the network necessary to
support the minimum capacity requirements of the distribution/manufacturing centre
were required. Although not entirely new to the firm, those skills were honed via
processes of enhanced imitation in the USA and the experience gained from
employing them at scale in the US operation could, and indeed was, transferred via
the firm’s internal specialist ‘communities of practice’ across Tesco’s international
operations.
Although the deep recession in the western US states following the global economic
crisis of 2007/2008 led to reconfiguration of both the planned pace and geography of
Fresh and Easy’s expansion, it is clear that the modularity of a network-configured
Walgreens-emulating model was central to Leahy’s vision of the scalability of the US
venture. Indeed, shortly after Leahy’s announcement in 2010 that he was stepping down
as Tesco CEO, former Tesco executive, Colin Smith—who had led the research team
posted to California in 2005 to prepare key dimensions of the market entry—revealed in
an interview the extent of Leahy’s vision of that potential scalability and market
growth: ‘It was (Leahy’s) idea to have 10,000 convenience stores, on every junction, in
every major city in the USA’ (Colin Smith quoted in FT.com 19 September 2010).
Developing via enhanced imitation, deploying and internalizing the capabilities
necessary to achieve this modularity, was clearly vital to the US expansion.
4.6. Enhanced imitation and organizational identity
Although enhanced imitation itself can facilitate capability deployment and internal-
ization, it brings important challenges. Notably, the firm’s organizational identity is
threatened as it becomes more isomorphic with its environment. This discord can
potentially cause internal rifts, stifling the organization. In Tesco’s case however,
enhanced imitation of capabilities was followed by a morphing of organizational
identity to fully embed these capabilities within the organization’s DNA.
Tesco appreciated that traditional US supermarket chains were being squeezed in a
fundamental way between the Wal-Mart led supercentre operators and an emergent
group of hard discount-retailers operating smaller format stores and achieving
significantly higher levels of profitability than the supermarket chains. In particular,
the US stores of the Albrecht family—Aldi in the east and Trader Joe’s in the west—
provided Tesco with important evidence of what could be achieved in this environment.
The innovative Trader Joe’s chain specifically offered a model of what was possible in
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the metro markets of the western USA, operating with exceptionally high sales densities
and profitability in the sort of urban markets, which, as a result of escalating
community resistance, Wal-Mart was finding it difficult to enter. The importance of
that evidence was consistently reiterated to us by Tesco interviewees. For example
‘It was an encouragement to be honest . . .when we realized what sales per square foot [Trader
Joe’s] was doing, it proved the point that small stores can do serious business’
—(Corporate Interviewee B)
The consequence was that as Tesco’s planning for its US market entry advanced, the
initial market positioning envisaged for the subsidiary (more hard discount Aldi-like)
changed as Tesco came to appreciate the value of emulating many features of the
Trader Joe’s offer, particularly in the areas of merchandizing, store atmospherics, and
aspects of its enhanced service-oriented culture. As one of our Tesco interviewees
commented: ‘We kind of grew towards Trader Joe’s’ and then explaining in greater
detail that
‘once you start studying the American retail market, you realize very quickly that Trader Joe’s
is the most successful food retailer in the market and it has the highest dollars per square
foot. . .So you’re hitting 30 to 40 dollars a square foot which for the US market is huge. . .You
realize they are doing something right. What are they doing well? They’re doing a lot of things
well—keeping the operation simple and learning from Aldi on that front and having this
relationship with customers—that is unique. It cuts across probably 75% of customer types in
terms of income and ethnicity’
—(Corporate Interviewee F)
Enhanced imitation of Trader Joe’s capabilities, however, did not absolve Tesco from
fine-tuning what it emulated—both to fit together with the very different type of
distribution/food preparation system which it had in mind, and the wider range of
communities which it was prepared to committed itself to enter. As one executive noted:
‘whether you call it imitation or not, clearly you tune it to the locality and what people
want’ (Corporate Interviewee B). Additionally, Tesco had a vision of Fresh and Easy
being more of a ‘main’ food shopping store than Trader Joe’s:
‘Trader Joe’s is quite a different animal . . . people use it as a secondary store. . . it’s about
finding things that that you can’t get anywhere else. Their shoppers are very loyal but they are
still doing big shops elsewhere. . . [In contrast] We have been described as a cross between a
Ralphs [mainstream supermarket] and Trader Joe’s
—(Corporate Interviewee B)
What is clear is that this ongoing process—which can be regarded as part of the firm’s
wider attempts to become isomorphic with the environment it had entered—involved
Tesco in significant levels of organizational identity morphing as it explored the growth
potential of its convenience-focused neighbourhood store entry vehicle. Enhanced
imitation allowed the firm to develop new capabilities suited to the new market, but the
deployment of those inevitably challenged its existing identity. That is to say, in
adjusting its understanding of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’ to accommodate the
capabilities identified via enhanced imitation, Tesco substantially improved its ability to
tailor the mass market model it employed in its wider international operations to the
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new local context. Again, the creation of a local identity delineated by the Fresh and
Easy brand supported, but was not prerequisite to this adaptation process.
5. Discussion
Tesco’s US market entry provides fertile ground through which to examine how
capabilities evolve and new capabilities are born during internationalization. The study
complements an emerging literature on the birth of capabilities during that process
which has tended to focus on smaller firms and high-technology settings (Helfat and
Lieberman, 2002; Tripsas, 2009; Autio et al., 2011). By virtue of examining growth in
large, multinational, technology-enabled firms, the study adds to the discourse on
subsidiary roles and the bundling and integration of resources and competencies to
achieve competitive advantage (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Rugman et al., 2011). Our
study examines capability dynamics in a large multinational retailer as it expanded into
the most competitive local retail market in the world. In so doing, our study makes
three contributions to existing conceptualizations of capability development, market
entry and the management of multinational retail firms.
5.1. Capability development, structural coherence and market entry
Our privileged access to this leading multinational retailer during market entry and
initial expansion in the USA has allowed us to develop a rich understanding of what
Currah and Wrigley (2004) describe as the ‘back-region’ organizational spaces of
Tesco’s US subsidiary. Tesco’s American foray has always been regarded as ‘high risk’,
and doubts have consistently been expressed by a wide range of commentators who
have drawn on the history of past failures by other UK retailers who have attempted to
enter the US market. The final outcome especially from a return-on-investment
perspective is, as yet, too early to call (see Appendix for more information). Our study
captures the challenges of capability development, deployment and internalization
which the firm has experienced and the implications for growth of its subsidiary in
western US markets. We found the structural coherence of capabilities—that is to say,
their capacity to represent meaningful frameworks capturing the interdependence of
routines—to be critical in the theoretical discussion of organizational capabilities.
Structural coherence allows managers to be aware of what is expected from each other
in a content that is geographically dispersed and across organizational units.
In particular, we found three core mechanisms of capability development during
market entry that allows firms to sustain, improve, or achieve structural coherence
when entering new international markets: transference, splicing and enhanced imitation
(see Table 3).
Transference is the deployment of inter-dependent tasks and capabilities in multiple
environments without local modification. As Tesco has progressively become a
multinational firm, it has learned to go beyond simple replication by building a dynamic
capability equivalent to the ‘plug and play model’ used in the personal computer
industry to facilitate user adoption. Transference of a core set of codified operating
processes through its ‘Tesco Operating Model’ greatly enhanced speed of implemen-
tation and reduced coordination costs.
Splicing entails the creation of new capabilities through unique recombination of
extant capability sets drawn from multiple locations. By allowing for these capabilities
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to originate from varying contexts in which the firm is active and even from other firms,
it extends current understanding of capability recombination and renewal (e.g. Helfat
and Peteraf, 2003). In Tesco, the process of splicing capabilities draws on both the
breadth of its international experience and the need for customization to the US
market. Splicing has facilitated the efficient generation of new forms of capabilities
demanded by the US market, by the means of piecing together capabilities drawn from
its successful international operations in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.
Notably, splicing in this way not only represents learning from experience (e.g. Winter,
2000), but also a more fundamental approach to knowledge sharing and organizational
adaptation that few studies have explored in the context of capability development.
Finally, enhanced imitation provides the highest degree of local adaptation—the
creation of a unique capability via the import of key strategic influences from outside
the organization’s knowledge pool, going beyond vicarious learning explanations found
in the literature (Baum et al., 2000). By purposefully emulating and adapting
Table 3. Capability constructs
Definition Examples of use
Transference ‘The replication of inter-dependent
tasks and capabilities in multiple
environments without local modification’
Tesco-in-a-Box
Global application of ‘the best of modern
retailing’ practices
Common back office, retail and operat-
ing capabilities replicated globally,
e.g. product categorization, supplier
selection, price setting, inventory
processing, distribution, financial
control and payroll processes
Splicing ‘The creation of a new capability through
unique recombination of extant
capability sets drawn from multiple
locations’
Formats—Express and Metro capability
in the UK used effectively but differ-
ently in the US context as new 10,000
square feet ‘convenience’ store.
Customer service—self-service checkouts
(builds on NCR/Tesco work in UK)—
new concept of ‘assisted service’
Supply chain/product development—
Riverside Distribution Centre, partner-
ships with tried and tested UK partner
suppliers plus stringent food safety/
global food standard controls on new
supply chain operations
Enhanced imitation ‘The creation of a unique capability via the
import of key strategic influences from
elsewhere in the global retail system’
Retail atmospherics—getting ‘touch and
feel’ to access local customer (small
stores connecting with American
consumer, e.g. Trader Joe’s)
Locational dynamics—site selection and
location to appeal to drive-by con-
sumer located in dense urban networks
(e.g. Walgreens locational strategy)
Product information—labeling on sour-
cing and ingredients of products (e.g.
Marks and Spencer/whole foods)
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local-market competitor formats, branding, positioning, retail atmospherics and so on,
Tesco has been able to create an entirely new offering in the USA—the Fresh and Easy
identity that differs substantively from both its UK home market and international
market identities.
These three capability development mechanisms have operated in overlapping if not
temporally sequenced manner. Initial transference, followed by splicing of capabilities,
has efficiently leveraged pre-existing organizational modularity possibilities. The
combination of transference and splicing reduced coordination costs, and substantially
helped initial market set up and subsequent growth. Local adaptation and customiza-
tion to the consumer cultures of western US markets has primarily been through
processes of enhanced imitation. Together, the triple combination of capability
development, deployment and internalization has been critical to ensuring growth in
what, unexpectedly, has turned out to be extremely adverse economic conditions in
which to enter the previously high-growth metro markets of Southern California,
Arizona and Nevada. In unpacking and conceptualizing Tesco’s US experience in this
way, our study contributes to the literature on capability development (e.g. Tallman
and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006; Agarwal
and Helfat, 2009), essentially by adding value to existing insights into the ways large
organizations enter markets by leveraging, deploying and internalizing new capabilities.
5.2. Capability development and organizational identity
This study is among the first to document the close linkage between capabilities and
identity. Although capabilities emphasizes the performative aspect of routines (e.g.
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Agarwal and Helfat 2009), the learning and entrepre-
neurial dimensions (e.g. George, 2005; Zahra et al., 2006), and the design and
modularity implications (e.g. Puranam et al., 2009), very little has been written about
the relationship between organizational capabilities and its identity, with few notable
exceptions (Tripsas, 2009; Danneels, 2011) that look at capabilities and identity during
phases of technological change.
We extend these efforts by portraying internationalization as a purposeful strategic
decision that simultaneously affects a firm’s identity and capability base. Most
established work has argued that internationalization does not increase internal variety
in organizing processes (Winter and Szulanski, 2001, Helfat and Lieberman, 2002, Keil
et al., 2009). Instead, wemaintain that entering a newmarket challenges an organization’s
identity. Both employees and external stakeholders have to adapt to the firm operating in
a new, and different, environment where the home market core values, norms, routines
and processes are unlikely to retain their structural coherence. By revealing how identity
buffering and identitymorphing operate when organizational capabilities are deployed in
the new context, and additionally how they substantially impact on the deployment and
internalization of capabilities and international growth, this study adds to discourses on
socialization processes in entrepreneurship and growth in a large corporate context.
There have been studies which have focused on how individuals adapt their role
identities when faced with a new context or new task (Gecas, 1982; Pratt and Foreman,
2000). For example, a study of academics during the commercialization of their
discoveries (Jain et al., 2009) found that they engaged in buffering behaviours that kept
their academic identity intact. However, little is known about how large organizations
react to challenges to their identity during market entry. Our study contributes to this
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literature by showing how identity buffering further enhances the beneficial effect of
transference on capability deployment, internalization and international growth.
Further, we find that identity morphing reinforces the positive effects of selective
capability transference, as well as splicing and enhanced imitation. In doing so, we
answer Livengood and Reger’s (2010) call for research on the micro-mechanisms of how
the modification of organizational identity may lead to competitive advantage (also see
Pratt and Foreman, 2000; Foreman and Whetten, 2002).
The processes of identity buffering and morphing preserve core elements of the firm’s
organizational identity, whilst providing adequate leeway to assimilate the values and
norms of its environment to shape its own behaviours. Similar to Danneels’s (2011)
work on Smith Corona, we found that that Tesco’s identity in its UK home market was
not fungible enough to guarantee successful deployment of capabilities and market
entry in the USA. The solution identified was to create a new local identity, most
notably expressed by the creation of the Fresh and Easy brand. Notably, such an
approach has so far only been documented in the international business literature for
entering more advanced markets (e.g. Tallman and Yip, 2008). Taken together, we add
to the literature by highlighting the interdependence of organizational identity and
capabilities, and the strategic options firms can choose to uphold this delicate balance
when they decide to enter new markets.
5.3. Managing market entry in the global retail industry
Not only do our findings have implications for theories of capability development,
market entry and international expansion, but they also provide insights into the
management of multinational retail firms. We note that after a long period, during
which the emergence of multinational retailers and surge of retail FDI was neglected in
debates on globalization, there has recently been sustained recognition of the
importance of multinational retailers in the global economy. Not least, their critical
role as intermediaries in international trade has resulted, in the words of OECD
economists, in the industry being subject to ‘unprecedented scrutiny under the
implementation of international trade and investment decisions’ (Nordas, 2008). In
parallel, there has been a rapid growth of theorizing both on the distinctive nature of
retail multinationals and the challenges they face in managing large, dispersed, store
and sourcing networks across economies with widely differing cultural, institutional and
business practices (Wrigley et al., 2005).
As stressed by this emerging literature on globalizing retail, market entry poses
particular challenges for retail multinationals. Essentially, this is because of the high
levels of investment in and commitment to ‘territorial embeddedness’ in the local
cultures of consumption, business practices, real estate and land-use planning systems,
supply networks etc. required of, and critical to, the competitiveness of the
multinational retailers in international markets (e.g. Tacconelli and Wrigley, 2009;
Livengood and Reger, 2010). Likewise, the construction of the webs of inter- and
extra-firm relationships which define the ‘network embeddedness’ of these firms in the
markets they enter poses similar challenges.
Learning to overcome those challenges transforms retail firms that commit
themselves to the path of internationalization. They become locked into continuous
and ongoing transnational-operation induced modification of their organizational
capabilities and identity (Wrigley et al., 2005). The depth of that process, however,
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varies considerably across firms and has been argued in the wider social science
literature to relate to the ‘genetic code’ a firm derives from what is referred to as its
‘societal embeddedness’ in the business practices, regulatory systems and corporate
cultures of its home market. In this context, there are significant differences between
apparel, consumer or luxury goods retailers internationalizing via processes of licensing
and franchising, and the largest 15 multinational retailers—which by 2008 had
international annual sales ranging from $13 to $110 billion. 13 out of these 15 firms
were food and general merchandise retailers operating extensive store networks which
they wholly owned and controlled, or in which they held majority share positions. These
increasingly large food and general merchandise retail multinationals are substantively
different from smaller franchising-oriented apparel or luxury goods retail multina-
tionals in terms of the scale and scope and complexity of their international investments
and operations, and in terms of the back-end logistics and supply chain management
processes associated with delivering effective local, regional and global sourcing. Our
study provides an early example of a case which focuses on and documents the
attendant capability development required during international market entry by such
firms.
6. Conclusions
Our study offers multiple avenues for future research. By a rich qualitative inquiry into
a high-risk market entry by one of most rapidly expanding retail multinationals, it has
revealed capability development mechanisms of transference, splicing and enhanced
imitation. All three mechanisms can subsequently be explored and tested using large
scale data collection and analysis. For example, future studies might explore conditions
where transference represents a better option than enhanced imitation or, alternatively,
the failure of efforts to splice capabilities. Moreover, while our rich empirical context
allows us to explore how these three dynamic capabilities are exerted and honed, we are
limited in terms of the insight it offers into how the capabilities themselves emerged (see
Zollo and Winter, 2002). For example, it is not clear whether they are the results of
organizational planning or learning, dedicated experimentation, serendipitous events or
outcomes of the efforts of dedicated individuals. Relatedly, we cannot clearly show
whether these dynamic capabilities are strongly path-dependent and causally ambigu-
ous from the outside, or rather easily imitable and transferable. Thus, we can only
surmise that they can help build competitive advantage and must leave to future
research the extent to which these capabilities themselves are a source of that advantage.
Additionally, whereas literature exists on the role of contextual differences in
internationalization and capability development (e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998;
Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Tallman and Yip, 2008), this literature tends to limit its
definition of contextual difference to variations between two countries in their national
cultures or their level of economic development. Building on our findings, we suggest
that future research might also look into other, more nuanced contextual factors, and
how these jointly pose opportunities and challenges for firms as they are striving to
deploy and internalize new and adapted capabilities, and achieve international growth.
Finally, we are limited by the specificity of our empirical context in multinational
retailing. Accordingly, we would encourage future research to study the processes of
capability development and organizational identity adaptation in other industrial
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settings to understand how factors such as environmental turbulence, consumer focus,
R&D intensity, or appropriability may influence the design and enactment of the
mechanisms we have uncovered.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, we were constrained in exploring how the
capability development processes impacted coordination costs or enhanced organiza-
tional efficiency, though we could see that it was manifested in higher growth potential.
As a result, another fruitful avenue would be to examine capability deployment and
internalization in the context of organizational design and its implications for
coordination costs. In short, our findings on organizational identity open a portfolio
of related studies that could add to debates relating to the ways firms maintain, adapt,
or evolve new identities when entering markets or exploiting new opportunities. From
an entrepreneurship literature perspective, precious few studies document how identity
shapes strategic action and its outcomes—and this represents an interesting area that
could provide valuable dividends in the overlap of socialization processes, entrepre-
neurial behaviour and performance.
Our study clearly has limitations. The ‘close dialogue’ with senior decision makers
provides richness to our analysis and findings. However, despite our attempts to inject a
comparative dimension into the study, it provides these insights essentially for a single
firm in a single industry. Further, the US market entry and expansion process of that
case study firm continues to evolve. Though we have some indication of the resilience of
the market entry in the face of extremely adverse economic conditions, it is early days to
infer whether the investment will be a success or failure. Limitations aside, however, we
believe the study adds considerable value to the literatures of capability development,
organizational identity and the entrepreneurial process of market entry.
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APPENDIX
A. An Update on Tesco’s US Market Entry
In 2010, Terry Leahy announced that he was stepping down as CEO of Tesco after what
was widely acknowledged to be one of the most transformative and successful
leaderships in UK corporate history. In that context, the greatest potential threat to
Leahy’s legacy was seen to be his high-risk decision to commit Tesco to the US market.
Indeed, by the time his successor, Philip Clarke, took over in 2011, Tesco’s commitment
of over £800m of capital to the US subsidiary and its accumulated US operating losses
of £574m, were beginning to generate the sort of capital market concerns and
shareholder unrest that Leahy had so successfully avoided during 15 years of building a
multinational retail giant. Growing concern with the firm’s underperformance in its UK
domestic market and increasing agitation for greater ‘core focus’ and investment began
to show marked similarities to the pressures which had forced Sainsbury to sell its
painstakingly developed, New England centred, Shaws/Star Market US subsidiary a
decade earlier (Wrigley, 2000).
In response to these pressures, and with the economic health of some of the
previously ‘fast growth’ US markets Tesco had entered (notably parts of Phoenix and
Las Vegas) continuing to suffer disproportionally from the impacts of global economic
crisis and the proceeding sub-prime mortgage collapse, Tesco has had to reconfigure
several aspects of its US expansion plans. In an attempt to stem the
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higher-than-anticipated operating losses and to deliver ‘break even’ in the USA by the
end of 2012–2013 that reconfiguration has involved:
(a) Closing or ‘mothballing’ 25 loss making stores—largely in Arizona and Nevada
but also including some in southern California east of Los Angeles and in central
California.
(b) An accompanying shift in the focus of new store development to northern and
more affluent coastal California—including entry into San Francisco and the
Bay Area.
(c) Format experimentation—specifically the development of smaller (3000 rather
than 10,000 sq ft) Fresh and Easy ‘Express’ stores. That is to say, transference
into the US subsidiary of the small convenience store operating skills which
Tesco had so successfully developed in the UK, and which it previously exported
with equal success to its subsidiaries in Asia (notably Thailand and South
Korea).
(d) Remodelling the design, atmospherics and product ranging of the Fresh and
Easy stores (including the adoption of in-store bakeries) to respond to the
significantly less utilitarian and ‘warmer’ designs which had been trialled and
rolled out other major competitors (including Wal-Mart)—that is to say using
enhanced imitation.
(e) Transference from the UK of Tesco’s market leading consumer loyalty
‘Clubcard’, and associated customer profiling and ‘insight’ analysis skills into
Fresh and Easy in the form of a ‘Friends of Fresh and Easy’ card—recognizing
that Tesco had also learned from similar transfers into its other international
subsidiaries the types of cultural adaptations necessary for that transfer to be
successful
Critically important to achieving operating cost ‘break even’ by 2013 is Tesco’s ability
to utilize its investment in the Riverside centralized distribution and food preparation
facility at a more efficient level—that is to say, by spreading the costs of those facilities
over a larger store network. Tesco’s new CEO has suggested that a network of around
300 stores might trigger the capacity utilization levels to ensure that, and has forecast
achieving the target in 2013. That implies adding another one hundred or so stores to
the number reached (190) as this article entered the publication process in May 2012.
The ability to achieve that using the reconfigured store development geographies which
have emerged in response to the significant redrawing of the map of regional and local
economic growth rates in the USA is crucial. Indeed, in a context of a widely held view
that Tesco must urgently reverse the underinvestment in its UK core operations to
protect its domestic market leadership, a continuing inability to shut off the higher than
expected start-up losses might seal the fate of Leahy’s US ‘gamble’. In contrast, if
break-even can be achieved on schedule, then the unexpectedly strong consumer
franchise which has been achieved by the Fresh and Easy brand becomes central.
Indeed, there is an increasingly strong body of opinion which suggests that a ‘reverse
transference’ from subsidiary to UK core might be possible. That is to say, the
high-quality, more neighbourhood-oriented, sustainability-focused, less-corporate
identity of Fresh and Easy might offer Tesco a route via which it can potentially
reach those higher affluence groups in the UK that have deserted what they perceive as
an over-dominant market leader in favour of Waitrose and other chains.
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